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The legal podcast Strict Scrutiny has adopted, and is merchandising, the 
catchy phrase, “Stare decisis is for suckers.”
1
 Doubtless the phrase is a rally 
cry for a podcast whose platform is “unvarnished, respectfully irreverent 
takes” on the U.S. Supreme Court.
2
 But before purchasing the hat or hoodie 
with the phrase emblazoned, it is worth asking to whom are the suckers the 
podcast is referring?  
Professor Richard Re suggests that stare decisis is a jurist-centered 
concept, where “precedent works as a shortcut by helping judges and 
justices decide cases quickly and lawfully by telling them that it is 
allowable to follow the path laid by past rulings,” while “operat[ing] as a 
shield by encouraging judges who have been critical of precedent to put 
aside their past views (whether publicly expressed or not) and start 
respecting stare decisis.”
3
 Perhaps sensing the tenor of the times, Circuit 
Judge Jerry E. Smith of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
writing on the losing end of a 2-1 decision in March 2020, accused his 
panel members of “rely[ing] on strength in numbers rather than sound legal 
principles in order to reach their desired result in [a] specific case.”
4
 He 
                                                                                                                 
 * 2016–2017 Law Clerk to the Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; 2015–2016 Law Clerk to the Honorable Jimmie V. Reyna of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; 2012–2013 Law Clerk to the Honorable 
Jorge A. Solis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. I earned my J.D., 
summa cum laude, from Texas Wesleyan University and my B.S. from the United States Air 
Force Academy. I would like to thank the entire staff of the Oklahoma Law Review, 
particularly the top-notch work of Allyson E. Shumaker, Hammons P. Hepner, and Michael 
F. Waters. I also would like to give a warm shout out to my wife, Amy, for all her support.  
 1. See Merchandise, STRICT SCRUTINY PODCAST, https://strict-scrutiny-podcast-
shop.myshopify.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2020). 
 2. See About, STRICT SCRUTINY PODCAST, https://strictscrutinypodcast.com/about/ (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2020). 
 3. Richard M. Re, Is “Stare Decisis . . . for Suckers”?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 24, 2020, 
8:30 AM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2020/03/is-stare-decisis-for-suckers. 
html. 
 4. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 952 F.3d 591, 603 (5th 
Cir.) (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 913 F.3d 573, 574 (5th 
Cir. 2019) (mem.), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 
(2020)), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 953 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2020). 
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then observed something never before uttered in a publicly available, 
published opinion: “[S]tare decisis is for suckers.”
5
 And, as singer/rapper 
Lizzo is wont to say, “Truth hurts.”
6
 But are there suckers out there with 
greater importance beyond judges and justices?  
The “struggle . . . over the role of stare decisis” is real when parties 
request that the Supreme Court overrule its own precedent.
7
 And with 
conservatives and progressives “largely talking past each other, the debate 
is certain to continue, unabated and unresolved” for the foreseeable future.
8
 
Endemic in this struggle is that the justices, at times, disagree about what 
standard or considerations (if any) should apply when deciding whether to 
adhere to stare decisis or overrule caselaw.
9
 When the current justices have 
articulated some of their considerations used to decide whether to overrule 
decisions, those considerations appear cabined to “the quality of the 
decision’s reasoning; its consistency with related decisions; legal 
developments since the decision; and reliance on the decision.”
10
 Lack of 
consensus has led some justices to claim in dissent that “it is not enough 
that five Justices believe a precedent wrong,” and that each overruling “can 
only cause one to wonder which cases the Court will overrule next.”
11
 
Although not always appreciated, the public are certainly among those 
wondering along with the dissenters. 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. 
 6. LIZZO, Truth Hurts, on CUZ I LOVE YOU (SUPER DELUXE) (Atlantic Records 2019). 
 7. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Supreme Court Precedent, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2, 2019, 9:54 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/scotus-for-
law-students-supreme-court-precedent/. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Compare Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“In my view, if the Court encounters a decision that is demonstrably 
erroneous—i.e., one that is not a permissible interpretation of the text—the Court should 
correct the error, regardless of whether other factors support overruling the precedent.”), 
with id. at 1969 (majority opinion) (“[I]n constitutional cases, a departure from precedent 
‘demands special justification.’ . . . This means that something more than ‘ambiguous 
historical evidence’ is required before we will ‘flatly overrule a number of major decisions 
of this Court.’” (first quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984); and then 
quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987))), and 
id. at 2008 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“And when ‘far-reaching systemic and structural 
changes’ make an ‘earlier error all the more egregious and harmful,’ stare decisis can lose its 
force.” (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018))).  
 10. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (citations omitted). 
 11. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2189, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/3
2021]    STARE DECISIS IS FOR PIRATES 247 
 
 
The modern conversation about stare decisis, tellingly, is largely jurist-
centric, relegating the interests of individuals in established precedent to the 
discrete category of “reliance.”
12
 The hyper-focus on quality of reasoning 
and jurisprudential workability has led to a philosophical debate red in 
tooth and claw among the justices and lower-court judges, not least because 
that level of abstraction resists limits and dulls objectivity.  
But if the focus shifted toward the public as the would-be sucker, as 
opposed to the justices and judges, then a system built to serve the former 
will orient toward how best to protect them when the latter contemplate 
whether to overrule cases. This shift recognizes that individuals are the ones 
who stand to gain or lose the most when judges decide whether stare decisis 
matters. If judges are no longer the primary suckers who matter, the outsize 
debate about precedent gravitates away from erudition and correctness. The 
untrammeled lens of stare decisis, sharpened by evidentiary and 
quantifiable considerations, instead can focus on how people have arranged 
their affairs and acclimated to a prior decision. In other words, norms 
overtake theory. 
October Term 2019 produced a decision that could serve as a model for a 
more norms-based, less jurist-centric, approach to stare decisis. The 
decision considered whether North Carolina could be sued for copyright 
infringement over its use of materials covering the pirate ship, Queen 
Anne’s Revenge.
13
 In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court demonstrated 
how to focus less on the learnedness of past decisions and more on the 
parties’ ability to provide evidence justifying society’s demand that a past 
decision be discarded.
14
 The Court admitted that Eleventh Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1499. 
 13. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020). 
In 1717, the pirate Edward Teach, better known as Blackbeard, captured a 
French slave ship in the West Indies and renamed her Queen Anne’s Revenge. 
The vessel became his flagship. Carrying some 40 cannons and 300 men, the 
Revenge took many prizes as she sailed around the Caribbean and up the North 
American coast. But her reign over those seas was short-lived. In 1718, the ship 
ran aground on a sandbar a mile off Beaufort, North Carolina. Blackbeard and 
most of his crew escaped without harm. Not so for the Revenge. She sank 
beneath the waters, where she lay undisturbed for nearly 300 years. 
Id. 
 14. See id. at 1003 (“Allen offers us nothing special at all; he contends only that if the 
Court were to use a clause-by-clause approach, it would discover that Florida Prepaid was 
wrong (because, he says again, the decision misjudged Congress’s authority under the 
Intellectual Property Clause).”). 
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precedents are rooted in reasoning “nowhere explicitly set out in the 
Constitution.”
15
 No big deal. That is so because the Court adjusted its focus 
from a critique of the past to an inquisition into whether the parties could 
supply evidence justifying why the current result should differ under 
analogous facts.
16
 In applying an approach tilted away from the justices and 
their predecessors, the Court accepted and applied the relevant precedents, 
explained that the parties proffered “nothing special” to deviate from them, 
and concluded without much trouble that Congress did not properly 
abrogate state sovereign immunity for lawsuits alleging piracy of 
copyrighted materials.
17
 The decision was civil, without concurring or 
dissenting aspersions. And it was punctilious to the point where only a 
sunken pirate ship could make the case lively. Yet the Court’s analysis 
made it clear that if any sucker was going to walk the plank in failed faith to 
stare decisis, it was the parties’ burden to nudge them along by showing 
how society had changed. 
This Article argues that the fraught debate about the role of stare decisis 
cannot depressurize unless and until the focus of its application shifts away 
from baroque analysis of judicial erudition and towards the ways in which 
normative expectations of society have adjusted, and continue to adjust, to 
precedent. The Article proceeds in two parts. It first explains the role of 
stare decisis in the American legal system. It then observes how Allen v. 
Cooper offers an exemplar in decision-making on the application of stare 
decisis. The decision demonstrates less concern for judges qua judges, 
according greater attention instead to how people are impacted by the 
prospect of overruling a decision. No one wants to be a sucker. Certainly 
not judges. Nor pirates. To these ends, adjusting the telescopic lens of stare 
decisis to accentuate norms-based, public concerns avoids consigning 
litigants and the public writ large to something even worse than being a 
sucker—an afterthought. 
II. The Role of Stare Decisis in the American Legal System 
Stare decisis is a malleable concept, not least because it is moored in 
common-law traditions that resist easy formulation.
18
 The justices and 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Id. at 1000. 
 16. See id. at 1003. 
 17. See id. at 1003, 1005–07. 
 18. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1982–83 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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judges, then, ultimately decide whether stare decisis is a default rule or an 
exception to the normal operation of deciding cases. This Part discusses the 
development of stare decisis in the American legal system and then 
explains its role as applied by the current Supreme Court justices. 
A. The Difficulty in Deciding Whether to Stand by the Past 
The Latin translation of stare decisis is “to stand by things decided.”
19
 
Stare decisis generally refers to standing by the rules established in prior 
cases.
20
 The doctrine has two general strains: vertical and horizontal stare 
decisis. Put most simply, decisions from higher courts are binding on lower 
courts under vertical stare decisis, whereas decisions outside of a court’s 
hierarchy are viewed as merely persuasive under horizontal stare decisis.
21
 
Only a higher court’s consideration of its own binding precedent presents 
the stare decisis difficulty: overrule or follow.
22
 
As explained by Professor Stephen Wermiel, the debate in the Supreme 
Court over whether to overrule precedent is all-consuming when 
interpreting the Constitution, as opposed to statutes, because “[i]f there is 
dissatisfaction with the court’s interpretation of a federal law, the logic 
goes, Congress can amend the law to correct the problem.”
23
 “With 
constitutional interpretation, however, justices feel freer to change course if 
they believe correction is needed, because the only alternative is amending 
the Constitution.”
24
 The sense of greater latitude to revisit constitutional 
decisions has contributed to the anxiety that anything and everything could 
change, constitutionally speaking, as one justice is nominated, confirmed, 
and replaces another.
25
 Justice Byron R. White all but admitted as much 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Wermiel, supra note 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: The Strength of Precedent Is in the Justices’ 
Actions, Not Words, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 28, 2018, 2:11 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2018/11/empirical-scotus-the-strength-of-precedent-is-in-the-justices-actions-not-words/. 
 22. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1861, 1910 (2014) (“Not only do lower courts lack the authority to overrule Supreme 
Court decisions, but their localized efforts at narrowing also pose much greater risks of 
creating doctrinal fragmentation.” (footnote omitted)); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 
III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2025 (1994) (“A lower court must always follow a higher 
court’s precedents.”).  
 23. Wermiel, supra note 7. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. (“[Justice] Breyer warned that it is ‘dangerous to overrule a decision only 
because five Members of a later Court come to agree with earlier dissenters on a difficult 
legal question.’”). 
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when he quipped, as each new justice joins the Court, “it’s a different 
court.”
26
 If so, the Court has been an evolution in progress since the 
eighteenth century. 
Sir William Blackstone explained in 1765 that stare decisis 
“[e]stablished customs” along with “rules and maxims” articulated by 
judges.
27
 Under the common-law tradition, “judicial decisions [were] the 
principal and most authoritative evidence, that [could] be given, of the 
existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law.”
28
 Sir 
Blackstone admonished that “precedents and rules must be followed, unless 
flatly absurd or unjust,” because a judge must make decisions “according to 
the known laws and customs of the land,” and not “according to his private 
sentiments” or “own private judgment.”
29
 Judge-made decisions thus “were 
seen as principles that had been discovered rather than new laws that were 
being made.”
30
 Writing in Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton also 
emphasized the important purpose of stare decisis: to “avoid an arbitrary 
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable” that federal judges “should be 
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point 
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”
31
  
Although rarely discussed explicitly in current cases, there is no 
reasonable dispute that constitutional interpretation remains a modern-day 
exercise in discovering meaning through common-law traditions.
32
 The 
Supreme Court made this point clear in the nineteenth century:  
It is common sense and not merely the blessing of the Framers 
that explains this Court’s frequent reminders that: “The 
interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is 
necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Linda Greenhouse, Every Justice Creates a New Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/opinion/27greenhouse.html. 
 27. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68–69. 
 28. Id. at *69. 
 29. Id. at *69–70. 
 30. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35, at 
129 (1988). 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 32. See, e.g., Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (2020) (“In our constitutional 
scheme, a federal court generally may not hear a suit brought by any person against a 
nonconsenting State. That bar is nowhere explicitly set out in the Constitution.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/3
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in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in 
the light of its history.”
33
 
That is so because the document “nowhere defines the meaning of” many of 
its words and phrases, suggesting that “it must be interpreted in the light of 
the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known 
to the framers of the Constitution.”
34
 Any denial of federal common law 
refuses to grapple with, at least, how courts have interpreted—and continue 
to interpret—the Constitution.
35
 The tradition of Sir Blackstone, then, is 
constitutional interpretation through discovery and reliance on past 
discoveries to find new ones. Only once “flatly absurd or unjust” does an 
interpretation become “not law.”
36
 
The Supreme Court did not address stare decisis in a meaningful way 
until the mid-nineteenth century. In Cook v. Moffat, Justice Robert Cooper 
Grier plainly paid respect to the jurists who had authored the precedent just 
twenty years earlier: “But as the questions involved in it have already 
received the most ample investigation by the most eminent and profound 
jurists, both of the bar and the bench, it may be well doubted whether 
further discussion will shed more light, or produce a more satisfactory or 
unanimous decision.”
37
 He concluded that, “at least, as the present case is 
concerned, the court do[es] not think it necessary or prudent to depart from 
the safe maxim of stare decisis.”
38
 The Supreme Court never again 
described stare decisis as a “safe maxim” in those exact words. Indeed, if 
stare decisis once offered safety, that virtue appears drowned by later 
justifications, both for and against, following precedent. 
Roughly fifty years later, toward the turn of the twentieth century, 
judicial attitudes about stare decisis began to change. In a dispute over 
customs and duties, Justice David Josiah Brewer became one of the first 
justices to attribute the outcome of a case to a change in the Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 175–76 (1973) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888)). 
 34. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (citations omitted). 
 35. See Rodriguez v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 140 S. Ct. 713, 717 (2020) (explaining 
that there is “no federal general common law” but “[i]nstead, only limited areas exist in 
which federal judges may appropriately craft the rule of decision”). 
 36. BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *70.  
 37. See Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 295, 309 (1847). 
 38. Id.  
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composition: “A change in the personnel of a court should not mean a shift 
in the law. Stare decisis is the rule, and not the exception.”
39
  
Rules and their exceptions, however, can change places. Over 100 years 
after Justice Brewer’s statement, Justice John Paul Stevens crystalized that 
underlying sentiment in his forceful dissent to in Citizens United v. FEC, a 
decision that overruled precedent permitting limits on federal campaign 
expenditures:  
Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of 
the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves 
an opportunity to change the law. . . . But if [stare decisis] is to 
do any meaningful work in supporting the rule of law, it must at 
least demand a significant justification, beyond the preferences 
of five Justices, for overturning settled doctrine.
40
 
He also castigated the majority’s refusal to acknowledge evidence in favor 
of stare decisis:  
Yet the basic shape and trajectory of 20th-century campaign 
finance reform are clear, and one need not take a naïve or 
triumphalist view of this history to find it highly relevant. The 
Court’s skepticism does nothing to mitigate the absurdity of its 
claim that Austin and McConnell were outliers. Nor does it alter 




Then, as now, Justice Brewer was onto something that grew as the 
twentieth century progressed. 
In 1938, one year after West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish abrogated the 
freedom of contract principle announced in Lochner v. New York
42
 and 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Hartranft v. Meyer, 149 U.S. 544, 545, 547 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
 40. 558 U.S. 310, 395, 398, 408 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 41. Id. at 434 n.59. 
 42. Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (“There is no 
absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty 
does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which 
consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive 
safeguards.”), with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“[I]n a private business, 
not dangerous in any degree to morals, or in any real and substantial degree to the health of 
the employees[,] . . . the freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in 
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ushered in a new epoch on constitutional views of the Commerce Clause 
and Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Hugo Lafayette Black dissented in an 
opinion in which he explained why, notwithstanding stare decisis, he did 
“not believe the word ‘person’ in the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
corporations.”
43
 His dissent further expounded that “[t]he doctrine of stare 
decisis, however appropriate and even necessary at times, has only a limited 
application in the field of constitutional law,” where “[t]his Court has many 
times changed its interpretations of the Constitution when the conclusion 
was reached that an improper construction had been adopted.”
44
 
Justice Black’s statement seemed to capture what every justice had 
silently come to understand. He just said the silent part out loud. It echoed, 
too, Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s remark that “no case is ever finally decided 
until it is rightly decided.”
45
  
And true enough, breaking from stare decisis has produced some of the 
Supreme Court’s greatest moments. In a case overruling precedent on the 
government’s ability to compel forced flag saluting, Justice Robert H. 
Jackson edified that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”
46
 Yet the 
difficulty in stare decisis lies in understanding when to exercise the 
awesome power the public licenses to its servants. For fixed stars can 
always burn out, and constellations can likewise fade from view depending 
on where you stand.  
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education (including Justice Black’s vote as a former Klansmen
47
) appears 
to be the first analysis to command a majority in which countervailing 
                                                                                                                 
relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered 
with, without violating the Federal Constitution.”). 
 43. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting St. Joseph Stock 
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (1936) (Stone and Cardozo, JJ., concurring)).  
 45. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 223 (1952) (“Mr. Justice Brandeis used to say that no case is ever finally decided 
until it is rightly decided.”). 
 46. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628–29, 642 (1943). 
 47. Nicandro Iannacci, Hugo Black, Unabashed Partisan for the Constitution, NAT’L 
CONST. CTR. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/hugo-black-unabashed-
partisan-for-the-constitution. 
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social circumstances overwhelmed stare decisis.
48
 In overruling the 
constitutional interpretation that separate-but-equal facilities are consistent 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal protection, the Court’s 
analysis looked not within itself at past decisions, but rather to forward-
leaning societal evidence on “the effect of segregation itself on public 
education”: 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 
1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when 
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public 
education in the light of its full development and its present 
place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way 
can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives 
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
49
 
Chief Justice Warren relied on evidence about how the precedents at 
issue were affecting American life in 1954 and into the foreseeable future: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and 
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic 
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the 
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust 
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be made available to all on equal terms.
50
 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954) (“Whatever may have been the 
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that 
segregation negatively affects educational development] is amply supported by modern 
authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”) (footnote 
omitted)). 
 49. Id. at 492–93. 
 50. Id. at 493. 
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And in overruling nearly fifty years of precedents, Chief Justice Warren 
still gave the justices who decided Plessy and its progeny the benefit of the 
doubt. As opposed to scrutinizing “the quality of the decision’s 
reasoning,”
51
 the Court charitably suggested that modern evidence was not 
available at the time of those decisions.
52
 Instead of dwelling on the past, 
Chief Justice Warren moved on. 
Since the “single greatest moment in Supreme Court history,” at least 
according to Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh,
53
 the Court’s treatment of stare 
decisis has devolved back to insular inquiries about past insight. Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey
54
 stands as a notable exception. There, the Court 
candidly assessed not the quality of a past decision, but “whether the rule is 
subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the 
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation.”
55
 It 
also considered “whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so 
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or 
justification.”
56
 Yet, with no precise formulation ever solemnized by the 
Court as to when to let precedent “stand,” applying stare decisis has proved 
as elusive and Delphic as when Sir Blackstone wrote about it years before 
the Constitution was a glimmer in the framers’ eyes.
57
 The danger of a 
doctrine moored in tenets of predictability, ironically, is its unpredictability 
in application.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 51. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019); see also Gamble v. 
United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Among these factors 
are the ‘workability’ of the standard, ‘the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at 
stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.’” (quoting Montejo v. 
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009))). 
 52. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11 (citing modern publications documenting the 
psychological effects of segregation). 
 53. Melissa Quinn, Kavanaugh: Brown v. Board of Education ‘Single Greatest Moment 
in Supreme Court History’, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 5, 2018, 2:31 PM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/courts/brett-kavanaugh-brown-v-board-of-
education-single-greatest-moment-supreme-court-history; see also Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 
S. Ct. 1390, 1411–12 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
 54. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 55. Id. at 854. 
 56. Id. at 855. 
 57. See Wermiel, supra note 7 (“[T]he judges do not appear to agree about what 
standards should govern the decision whether to overrule a prior case.”). 
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B. Default Rule or Mere Exception  
Any restraint posed by stare decisis has abated in recent years. The only 
consensus to emerge in this area appears to be that no one has been able to 
provide a satisfactory test, standard, or framework around which judges can 
coalesce. That is most likely because the doctrine has shrunk to something 
“purely permissive in nature.”
58
 
The numbers bear out a diluted doctrine. Since the ratification of the 
Constitution on June 21, 1788,
59
 the Supreme Court has overruled, 
implicitly or explicitly, its decisions over 300 times.
60
 The last seventy 
years account for over 200 of those instances.
61
 This phenomenon could be 
explained in two broad strokes. First, the Supreme Court is correcting past 
decisions with deleterious effects on society. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has 
made clear his view that “[t]he Supreme Court has largely failed throughout 
American history at its most important tasks and at the most important 
times.”
62
 So some measure of cleanup would seem necessary. Another 
perhaps more cynical view is that, once ensconced, each justice truly acts to 
create a “different court,” in which the temptation to overrule a disliked 
decision is far greater than the Framers could have anticipated.
63
  
The current justices appear to agree that stare decisis “promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process.”
64
 Yet the justices are just as 
quick to caution that stare decisis has never been “an inexorable command,” 
and it is “at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution.”
65
  
All but one of the justices appear to espouse that a departure from 
precedent demands “‘special justification,’ over and above the belief ‘that 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See Re, supra note 3 (suggesting that precedent may no longer have binding force). 
 59. NCC Staff, The Day the Constitution Was Ratified, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 21, 
2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-day-the-constitution-was-ratified.  
 60. Feldman, supra note 21. 
 61. See id.  
 62. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Supreme Failure, POLITICO (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/the-supreme-court-has-failed-111450. 
 63. Cf. Greenhouse, supra note 26 (“[T]he substitution of one personality for another 
matters in real life more than it might seem to matter on paper.”). 
 64. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019). 
 65. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 828 (1991)). 
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the precedent was wrongly decided.’”
66
 During October Term 2018, Justice 
Clarence Thomas made unmistakable his view that the Court “should not 
follow” “a demonstrably erroneous precedent.”
67
 Although he may have 
articulated similar views in the past, he had never been more emphatic that 
“[c]onsiderations beyond the correct legal meaning, including reliance, 
workability, and whether a precedent ‘has become well embedded in 
national culture,’ . . . are inapposite.”
68
 In a separate opinion, Justice Neil 
M. Gorsuch suggested that “when ‘far-reaching systemic and structural 
changes’ make an ‘earlier error all the more egregious and harmful,’ stare 
decisis can lose its force.”
69
 Yet Justice Gorsuch still seems amenable to 
referencing considerations beyond demonstrable error when deciding 
whether to overrule decisions.
70
 
Aside from Justice Thomas, the current justices seem at least willing to 
consider four touchpoints before overruling a decision: “[1] the quality of 
the decision’s reasoning; [2] its consistency with related decisions; [3] legal 
developments since the decision; and [4] reliance on the decision.”
71
 In 
April 2020, Justice Kavanaugh suggested a slight refinement of these 
touchpoints in a solo opinion. Special justifications exist, Justice 
Kavanaugh argued, when the decision “is egregiously wrong, it has 
significant negative consequences, and overruling it would not unduly upset 
reliance interests.”
72
 Around that time, at least five justices also suggested 
to varying degrees that stare decisis is undermined when a decision or rule 
is tainted with “racist origins.”
73
 To the extent there is some consensus on a 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (2020) (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014)); see also Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1969 (“[A] 
departure from precedent ‘demands special justification.’”) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 
467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). 
 67. See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1984 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. at 1986 (quoting STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S 
VIEW 152 (2010)). 
 69. Id. at 2008 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 70. See id. at 2009 (“[I]f it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals’ interest in its 
discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement ‘entitlement’ to its persistence.”) 
(footnote omitted).  
 71. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (citations omitted). 
 72. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1420 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in 
part). 
 73. See Leah Litman, Ten Thoughts on Ramos v. LA, TAKE CARE (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/ten-thoughts-on-ramos-v-la (“The majority and separate 
writings by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh emphasize the racist origins of 
Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury rule.”).  
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framework or standard, actual application bedevils any cohesion and 
betrays a court “in crisis.”
74
 
Surveying these and other recent cases, Professor Re suggests that stare 
decisis is best understood as “thinking about precedent as a permission, not 
a constraint.”
75
 He argues that “maybe precedent’s applicability does or 
should function not as a mandate to rule in a particular way, but rather as 
reassurance that a particular approach is lawful.”
76
 Although Professor Re 
portrays stare decisis as “for everyone,” his justification for stare decisis 
could not be more jurist-centric.
77
 He offers two reasons as to why 
precedent should be viewed less as a “mandate” and more as providing 
“reassurance” that a past approach was correct.
78
 First, “precedent works as 
a shortcut by helping judges and justices decide cases quickly and lawfully 
by telling them that it is allowable to follow the path laid by past rulings.”
79
 
Second, “precedent operates as a shield by encouraging judges who have 
been critical of precedent to put aside their past views (whether publicly 
expressed or not) and start respecting stare decisis.”
80
 Put differently, stare 
decisis is an optional judicial aid in decision-making that should promote 
reassurance. 
Yet for a doctrine moored in predictability and stability, its cornerstones 
are crumbling apace. About 71% of the decisions overruling precedent 
under Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. are 5-4.
81
 This record contrasts with 
his immediate predecessor, William H. Rehnquist, whose tenure as chief 
justice oversaw only 31% of overrulings cast in 5-4 votes.
82
 Perhaps this 
collision of unyielding positions helps explain why more than half of 
Americans believe that the justices are unable to set aside their personal and 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Linda Greenhouse, A Precedent Overturned Reveals a Supreme Court in Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/opinion/supreme-court-
precedent.html. 
 75. Re, supra note 3. 
 76. Id.  
 77. See id.  
 78. See id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Handed Down a Unanimous Decision that Bodes 
Ill for the Future of Civil Rights, VOX (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/3/25/ 
21192320/supreme-court-comcast-decision-civil-rights-mixed-motive-lawsuits. 
 82. Id. 
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political views when deciding constitutional cases.
83
 It is as if two sides 
have ossified, “largely talking past each other.”
84
 
This perception is shaped not just by numbers, but also rhetoric. For 
example, in a decision overruling a forty-year-old case about whether a 
state can require payment of agency fees to assist public-sector unions, the 
majority stressed in 2018 that the past decision “was poorly reasoned,”
85
 its 
rule was “impossible to draw with precision,”
86
 the “ascendance of public-
sector unions has been marked by a parallel increase in public spending,”
87
 
and “reliance does not carry decisive weight.”
88
 The dissent claimed that 
this overruling “will have large-scale consequences,” not least because, 
“[a]cross the country, the relationships of public employees and employers 
will alter in both predictable and wholly unexpected ways.”
89
 The dissent 
also accused the majority of “bursting with pride over what it has 
accomplished”
90
 by “weaponizing the First Amendment”
91
 to overrule 
precedent with no justification beyond that “it never liked the decision”
92
 
and “because it wanted to.”
93
 
The following year, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissenting for himself 
and three others, explained the difficulty that the justices face when 
weighing the application of stare decisis. He made manifest that, while a 
course-correction temptation is ever present, stability matters: 
And I understand that, because opportunities to correct old errors 
are rare, judges may be tempted to seize every opportunity to 
overrule cases they believe to have been wrongly decided. But 
the law can retain the necessary stability only if this Court resists 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See Kalvis Golde, Recent Polls Show Confidence in Supreme Court, with Caveats, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 22, 2019, 10:03 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/recent-
polls-show-confidence-in-supreme-court-with-caveats/ [hereinafter Golde, Confidence with 
Caveats].   
 84. Wermiel, supra note 7. 
 85. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2479, 2486 (2018). 
 86. Id. at 2481.  
 87. Id. at 2483.  
 88. Id. at 2484.  
 89. Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 2501.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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And similar to Justice Brewer in 1893 and Justice Stevens in 2010, Justice 
Breyer said the silent part out loud: “Today’s decision can only cause one 
to wonder which cases the Court will overrule next.”
95
 One month later, and 
after another 5-4 overruling, Justice Elena Kagan reiterated the same 
concern: “Well, that didn’t take long. Now one may wonder yet again.”
96
  
Around this time, the legal podcast Strict Scrutiny adopted the moniker, 
“Stare decisis is for suckers.”
97
 Perhaps sensing the zeitgeist of the legal 
moment, Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith accused fellow panel members in 
March 2020 of “rely[ing] on strength in numbers rather than sound legal 
principles in order to reach their desired result” in a politically charged 
appeal that questioned the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s structure.
98
 His dissent then suggested something never 




Many spectators believe that this “trend is likely to accelerate” for three 
reasons: historic reversal rates, lack of restraint among jurists when 
questioning the motives of their colleagues, and the appointment of 
“staunchly conservative Justice Brett Kavanaugh” to replace “the relatively 
moderate conservative Justice Anthony Kennedy.”
100
 These circumstances 
have caused the progressive justices to stomach, on stare decisis grounds, 
precedent that they may not prefer because “they fear their conservative 
colleagues plan to overrule many seminal decisions in the future.”
101
 In 
other words, without five votes, the only offense for progressives is a good 
defense. 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 97. See Merchandise, STRICT SCRUTINY PODCAST, https://strict-scrutiny-podcast-
shop.myshopify.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2020). 
 98. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 952 F.3d 591, 603 (5th 
Cir.) (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 913 F.3d 573, 574 (5th 
Cir. 2019) (mem.), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 
(2020)), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 953 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2020).  
 99. See id. 
 100. See Millhiser, supra note 81. 
 101. Id.  
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Bolstered with numbers, inexorable pressure exists for conservatives to 
press their advantage.
102
 For example, Professor Adrian Vermeule 
advocated, in the middle of a pandemic, that in a world where “in recent 
years, legal conservatism has won the upper hand in the Court and then in 
the judiciary generally” conservative justices and judges should turn away 
from originalist precepts and seize their opportunity to instantiate “a 
substantive moral constitutionalism.”
103
 Several maxims would dominate 
under this conservative theory of “common-good constitutionalism”: 
[R]espect for the authority of rule and of rulers; respect for the 
hierarchies needed for society to function; solidarity within and 
among families, social groups, and workers’ unions, trade 
associations, and professions; appropriate subsidiarity, or respect 
for the legitimate roles of public bodies and associations at all 
levels of government and society; and a candid willingness to 
“legislate morality”—indeed, a recognition that all legislation is 
necessarily founded on some substantive conception of morality, 




As a result, says the Harvard law professor, the government should, and 
possibly must, “judge the quality and moral worth of public speech,” reject 
an individual’s right “to define one’s own concept of existence,” enforce 
“duties of community and solidarity in the use and distribution of 
resources,” and deny “the selfish claims of individuals to private rights.”
105
 
All is necessary, according to Processor Vermeule, “to ensure that the ruler 
has the power needed to rule well.”
106
 Perceived power, in its barest form 
based on counting judicial votes, animates this “ambitious project, one that 
abandons the defensive crouch of originalism and that refuses any longer to 
play within the terms set by legal liberalism.”
107
 Professor Vermeule’s 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See Garrett Epps, Common-Good Constitutionalism Is an Idea as Dangerous as 
They Come, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/
common-good-constitutionalism-dangerous-idea/609385/. 
 103. Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-good-constitutionalism/609037/. 
 104. Id.  
 105. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
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assessment of the status of the American legal system—and its potential—
is astonishingly and breathtakingly honest. 
Whatever one might think about a progressive vision of the Constitution 
or the conservative legal project more generally, the fact that the Court is 
overruling with greater frequency and less consensus is worse than 
problematic. The Court’s current application of stare decisis—largely 
through hindsight about the quality of decision-making—is difficult to 
explain in a consistent way without betraying the cynical view that 
constitutional law is nothing more than politics disguised in black robes. It 
leads scholars like Professor Garrett Epps to suggest that certain justices are 
acting out of hubris, not least because the “‘I know best about everything’ 
attitude is excusable (though annoying) in a law professor, whose views cut 
no real-world ice with anyone, but they ill-become a judge.”
108
 “The claim 
of authority” to second-guess all precedents, Professor Epps continues, “is 
outlandish, and verges on the delusional.”
109
 For even Justice Antonin 
Gregory Scalia would admit some restraint is necessary: “I am an 
originalist, but I am not a nut.”
110
 These sentiments harken back to the 
bygone era of Justice Jackson when he said in 1949, in a different time but 
not entirely different circumstances: “There is danger that, if the Court does 
not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert 
the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”
111
 
Perhaps to provide some stability and doctrinal guardrails, Professor 
Michael Gerhardt, “an authority on Supreme Court uses of precedent,” has 
attempted to define certain decisions that are off limits to reconsideration: 
Super precedents are the doctrinal, or decisional, foundations for 
subsequent lines of judicial decisions (often but not always in 
more than one area of constitutional law). Super precedents are 
those constitutional decisions in which public institutions have 
heavily invested, repeatedly relied, and consistently supported 
over a significant period of time. Super precedents are deeply 
embedded into our law and lives through the subsequent 
activities of the other branches. Super precedents seep into the 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See Garrett Epps, Clarence Thomas Is in the Wrong Line of Work, ATLANTIC (Mar. 
7, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/clarence-thomas-thinks-he-
knows-best/584263/. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949). 
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Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel posit a similarly normative 
approach in which “constitutional interpretations are truly and finally 




Public confidence and trust are the rally points for our “least dangerous” 
branch of government.
114
 And to build back what, to some, has been lost 
requires recalibrating stare decisis from an almost pure question of “the 
preferences of five justices for overturning settled doctrine” to how much 
citizens have empirically relied on, oriented their lives to, and continued to 
acclimate to a decision.
115
  
When the justices extoll stare decisis as “promot[ing] the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] 
reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process,”
116
 it is worth asking to whose benefit are 
those virtues directed? The obvious answer, which no judge would gainsay, 
is that these virtues benefit society and the public to whom they are 
servants. And the legal system is built for judges to serve the people. The 
stare decisis difficulty, then, should be resolved based upon how those 
people cope with and arrange their lives around decisions penned by a 
historical majority upholding its good-faith oath to the Constitution. It is not 
that the quality of past decision-making does not matter. It is just not the 
most relevant question to ask. 
The stare decisis difficulty can be solved by norms—not theory. 
Traditional methods of reviewing a past decision for erudition, quality of 
reasoning, and consistency should, of course, play a role in deciding 
whether a decision was and is correct. Those touchpoints also can figure 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Epps, supra note 108 (quoting University of North Carolina law professor Michael 
Gerhardt). 
 113. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, NAT’L CONST. CTR., 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/white-papers/democratic-constitution 
alism (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).  
 114. See Joshua D. Hawley, The Most Dangerous Branch, NAT. AFFAIRS, https://www. 
nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-most-dangerous-branch (last visited Sept. 5, 
2020) (quoting Alexander Hamilton). 
 115. Wermiel, supra note 7. 
 116. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (quoting Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). 
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into whether a decision needs to be overruled. But those jurist-centric, 
largely value-laden calls should not supplant how people handle precedent. 
Confidence and trust benefit the American legal system writ large when 
judges care most about what the evidence says about the facts on the 
ground now and later.  
This is not a new concept. In 1908, then-attorney Louis D. Brandeis 
pioneered what is now known as the “Brandeis Brief,” where he defended 
the constitutionality of certain Oregonian labor laws by presenting “a 
barrage of social scientific evidence to show the relationship between long 
hours, worker health, and public welfare.”
117
 And it worked: the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the labor laws just three years removed 
from Lochner, which had struck down similar laws as violating certain 
constitutional liberty interests.
118
 The effect of a constitutional decision on 
the public, all told, should perform the heavy lifting when considering stare 
decisis. What is right, or what is wrong, is less salient, especially when case 
outcomes turn on only slight majorities. 
To envision how a case would look in which judges care less about their 
predecessors might seem difficult at first blush. Yet October Term 2019 
offers such an example. And perhaps most fittingly, it was a case about a 
sunken pirate ship and salvaging its wreckage, so everyone can learn from 
and enjoy it.  
III. Salvaging an Approach to the Stare Decisis Difficulty 
The difficulty judges face when fighting the impulse to overrule 
disfavored decisions can be tamed. That can happen if stare decisis is 
viewed through the lens of how society has adapted to the good-faith efforts 
of those in the past to distill meaning from the “majestic generalities and 
ambiguities of”
119
 phrases written in the late 1700s. It is therefore ironic 
that a dispute over a 300-year-old sunken pirate ship materialized into a 
civil discussion, which could serve as a model for deciding when to 
overrule precedent. This Part discusses the development of state sovereign 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Nicholas Mosvick, On This Day, the Supreme Court Upholds Limits on Women and 
Factory Work Hours, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/ 
blog/on-this-day-the-supreme-court-upholds-limits-on-women-and-factory-work-hours. 
 118. See id.  
 119. See Randy Barnett, Common-Good Constitutionalism Reveals the Dangers of Any 
Non-Originalist Approach to the Constitution, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/dangers-any-non-originalist-approach-constitution/ 
609382/ (quoting Vermeule, supra note 103). 
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immunity, details how a case about a sunken pirate ship was able to dock at 
the Supreme Court, and explains how the Court’s decision can serve as an 
archetypical guide to a more norms-based approach to stare decisis. 
A. A Sunken Ship and Buried Precedents 
A case from North Carolina brought together copyrights, patents, 
bankruptcy, sovereign immunity, pirates, and (of course) stare decisis. 
Edward Teach, better known as Blackbeard, captured a French slave ship in 
the West Indies in 1717 and renamed her Queen Anne’s Revenge.
120
 
Boasting roughly forty cannons and a crew of around 300 sailors, Queen 
Anne’s Revenge became Blackbeard’s flagship for pirate-related exploits 
along the Caribbean and North American coast.
121
 But just one year later, 
her reign over the seas ended when she ran aground on a sandbar about one 
mile off the coast of Beaufort, North Carolina.
122
 Although Blackbeard and 
most of his crew survived, the ship sank and lay dormant for nearly three 
centuries.
123
 Yet during those 300 years, while the wreckage awaited 
discovery, legal developments occurred apace, some of which would 
ultimately decide the fate of Blackbeard’s ship. 
Ratified in 1788, sixty years after Queen Anne’s Revenge submerged, 
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”
124
 Five years later, in Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme 
Court concluded that individuals could sue states in federal court because 
“[w]hen a state, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to 
the judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her 
right of sovereignty.”
125
 Just one year after the Supreme Court handed 
down Chisholm, the states responded by ratifying the Eleventh Amendment 
to the Constitution, which explicitly superseded parts of Chisholm, 
providing that the “Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.”
126
 Although 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 125. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 452, 463 (1793). 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021





 the “Court has interpreted [the Eleventh Amendment] to 
grant states and state agencies broad immunity from private suit by private 
individuals, for any remedy, in any court, for violations of federal law.”
128
 
Following the Civil War, the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which provides under Section 1 that no state can “deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”
129
 and under Section 
5 that “Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article.”
130
 And in a similarly non-textual approach, 
appropriate legislation under Section 5 enforcing the substantive provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment “must create a statutory right that is 




Toward the end of the twentieth century, and against the backdrop of 
these constitutional powers, Congress passed the Copyright Remedy 
Clarification Act of 1990 (CRCA), providing that a State “shall not be 
immune, under the Eleventh Amendment . . . or any other doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court” for copyright 
infringement,
132
 and that a state will be liable, and subject to remedies, “to 
the same extent as” a private party.
133
 The CRCA served as “the model for 
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Clarification Act (Patent Remedy 
Act),” which became law two years later and denied state sovereign 
immunity to allegations of patent infringement in a similar manner.
134
 
Around the time Queen Anne’s Revenge awoke from her 300-year 
slumber, the Supreme Court heard three cases with portents bearing on the 
ship. In 1996, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court concluded 
that Congress could not abrogate sovereign immunity through the exercise 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1000 (“In our constitutional scheme, a federal court 
generally may not hear a suit brought by any person against a nonconsenting State. That bar 
is nowhere explicitly set out in the Constitution.”). 
 128. Howard M. Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview: Copyright and Sovereign 
Immunity in Davy Jones’ Locker, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 29, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www. 
scotusblog.com/2019/10/aaarrrgument-preview-copyright-and-sovereign-immunity-in-davy-
jones-locker/ [hereinafter Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview]. 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  
 131. Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview, supra note 128. 
 132. 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2018). 
 133. Id. § 511(b). 
 134. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 n.1 (2020). 
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of its powers under the Indian Commerce Clause.
135
 The decision planted 
some cardinal guideposts to help determine whether Congress may 
permissibly pass laws holding states liable. Writing for a 5-4 majority 
overruling certain precedents on congressional power, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist observed that “the States’ immunity from suit must be obvious 
from ‘a clear legislative statement.’”
136
 He then sweepingly declared that 
“Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed 
upon federal jurisdiction.”
137
 Justices Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
joined a dissent written by Justice David H. Souter, arguing that Congress 
may abrogate state sovereign immunity consistent with Article I and the 
Eleventh Amendment when the lawsuit invokes a federal interest between a 
state and one of its citizens.
138
  
Three years later, in another 5-4 decision by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
Court concluded in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board v. College Savings Bank that Congress did not abrogate sovereign 
immunity through the Patent Remedies Act, not just because “Congress 
may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I 
powers,”
139
 but also because the statutory rights created under the Patent 
Remedies Act were not congruent and proportional to the constitutional 
right not to be deprived of property without due process.
140
 Justice Stevens 
dissented, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, maintaining that 
“[i]t is quite unfair for the Court to strike down Congress’ Act based on an 
absence of findings supporting a requirement this Court had not yet 
articulated.”
141
 Justice Stevens also criticized the merits of the 5-4 decision, 
which he claimed “threaten[ed] to read Congress’ power to pass 
prophylactic legislation out of § 5 altogether.”
142
  
                                                                                                                 
 135. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). 
 136. Id. at 55 (citation omitted). 
 137. Id. at 73.  
 138. See id. at 184–85 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that sovereign immunity should 
function differently in the context of cases in federal court by way of federal-question 
jurisdiction).  
 139. 527 U.S. 627, 636, 647–48 (1999) (“These are proper Article I concerns, but that 
Article does not give Congress the power to enact such legislation after Seminole Tribe.”). 
 140. See id. at 647 (“The Patent Remedy Act’s indiscriminate scope offends this 
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scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy.”). 
 141. Id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id.  
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Clinching a relevant trilogy on state sovereign immunity, the Court 
handed down Central Virginia Community College v. Katz in 2006, 
representing yet another 5-4 decision.
143
 This time, however, Justice 
Stevens wrote for the majority, holding that Congress could subject states to 
suit under laws enacted under Article I’s Bankruptcy Clause.
144
 To 
recalibrate the sweeping language of Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid 
that nothing in Article I could provide a congressional source of power to 
suspend state sovereign immunity, Justice Stevens clarified that “we are not 
bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue 
was not fully debated.”
145
 Justice Thomas argued for the dissenters that 
“nothing in Article I of the Constitution establishes” the power of Congress 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity, which “the Court today casts 
aside . . . to hold that the States are subject to suit by a rather unlikely class 
of individuals—bankruptcy trustees seeking recovery of preferential 
transfers for a bankrupt debtor’s estate.”
146
  
State sovereign immunity, although of suspect origin in the constitutional 
text, continued to swell in its usage as a defense from suit brought by 
private individuals until Katz.
147
 The question after Katz was whether the 
decision signaled a retreat from, and possible jettison of, precedents.  
B. The Rediscovery of Both a Pirate Ship and State Sovereign Immunity  
Returning to Blackbeard: just as the Supreme Court began handing down 
decisions more fully interpreting and explaining the contours of state 
sovereign immunity, Intersal Inc., a Palm Bay, Florida, salvage and 
research company, discovered the wreckage of Queen Anne’s Revenge in 
1996, the same year the Court issued Seminole Tribe.
148
 Under established 
federal and state law, the wreck belongs to North Carolina.
149
 Intersal 
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 144. See id. at 359, 379. 
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agreed to salvage the vessel, acknowledging North Carolina’s ownership of 
the ship, while receiving the right to keep any proceeds from documentary 
video and photography.
150
 In 1998, one year before the Court decided 
Florida Prepaid, Intersal engaged Fayetteville, North Carolina-based 
videographer Fredrick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions LLC, 
to produce videos and photos of the wreck.
151
 The parties agreed that North 
Carolina could “publish accounts and other research documents relating to 
the artifacts, site area, and project operations for noncommercial 
educational or historical purposes.”
152
 For over a decade, during which the 
Court completed its precedential trilogy with Katz, Allen created videos and 
photos of efforts to salvage guns, anchors, and other remains from the 
wreckage.
153
 And he registered copyrights in those works.
154
 
After North Carolina began to publish some of his videos and photos, 
Allen initially protested in 2013 that the state was exceeding the agreement 
and infringing his copyrights.
155
 Nautilus and the state agreed to settle the 
dispute, with the state paying $15,000, taking down its infringing uses, 
promising not to use the material in the future, and marking any of Allen’s 
material with a time stamp and watermark.
156
 The détente was short-lived.  
Allen complained shortly after the settlement that North Carolina had 
“impermissibly posted five more of his videos online and used one of his 
photos in a newsletter.”
157
 And when Allen and Nautilus demanded that the 
state take the new material down, the state responded by enacting 
“Blackbeard’s Law,” which designated as a public record all photographs, 
video recordings, and other documentary materials of shipwrecks, all while 
voiding any previous settlement agreement on wreckage materials.
158
 With 
that, a lawsuit 300 years in the making came to fruition. 
In 2015, Allen and Nautilus sued North Carolina and its various officials 
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
159
 The 
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 154. Id.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Wasserman, Aaarrrgument Preview, supra note 128. 
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state then moved to dismiss certain claims on the basis of sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
160
 In an extraordinarily candid 
decision handed down in March 2017, District Judge Terrence W. Boyle 
refused to dismiss the copyright claims, not least because “[i]n this 
particular case Congress has clearly abrogated state immunity in cases 
arising under the CRCA, and such an abrogation is congruent and 
proportional to a clear pattern of abuse by the states.”
161
  
In permitting copyright claims to progress in litigation, Judge Boyle 
explained that Supreme Court precedents interpreting the Eleventh 
Amendment are “flawed and contrary to the fundamental nature and 
meaning of the Constitution,”
162
 for “[t]he doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity to federal law in federal court has frustrated the essential function 
of the federal courts to ensure the uniform interpretation and enforcement 
of the supreme law of the land.”
163
 He described how the doctrine (1) 
“frustrates the ability of individuals to receive what may be the only 
practical remedy available to them as plaintiffs”; (2) “does not enhance 
constitutional protections or advance the ideals of our constitutional form of 
government in which the people are sovereign”; and (3) “has strangely 
turned our federal form of government and the Supremacy Clause on its 
head by leaving states free to resist at their pleasure that federal law which 
we claim is the supreme law of the land.”
164
 Judge Boyle concluded by 
impugning “the soundness of such a doctrine being imported to words that, 
on their very face and plain meaning, do not extend so broadly,” while 
“call[ing] for the higher courts to reconsider this doctrine” because he “is 
constrained, under the absolute hierarchical system of courts in the federal 
judiciary, to hold that the defense of sovereign immunity is available to the 
states in federal court.”
165
 
On appeal, Circuit Judge Paul Victor Niemeyer reversed on the issue of 
state sovereign immunity in July 2018, concluding that the claims against 
North Carolina and its officials must be dismissed.
166
 The Fourth Circuit’s 
analysis was succinct: Florida Prepaid controls the outcome, Congress did 
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not “validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,” and the sovereign-
immunity provision under the CRCA is invalid as a result.
167
 
Allen filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court presenting this 
question: “Whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity 
via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act in providing remedies for 
authors of original expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by 
states.”
168
 The Supreme granted certiorari a few months later.
169
 
The merits-stage briefing offered differing takes on what the precedential 
trilogy meant.
170
 Allen argued that Congress properly abrogated state 
sovereign immunity under both Article I and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because Katz overruled the dicta in Seminole Tribe upon which 
Florida Prepaid relied.
171
 Katz established a clause-by-clause analysis, 
Allen asserted, which clarified that the text of Article I gives Congress 
exclusive power over copyrights and that state encroachment in this area 
would be “repugnant” to that power.
172
 In support of Congress’s authority 
under Section 5, Allen maintained that the CRCA is congruent and 
proportional to the constitutional protections against both deprivation of 
property without due process and uncompensated takings of property, not 
least because Congress “compiled a robust legislative record, showing a 
pattern of copyright infringement by states and the absence of any 
satisfactory remedy” other than state-law damages actions.
173
 North 
Carolina responded by arguing that Florida Prepaid should control the 
outcome and that Katz—rather than overruling Florida Prepaid sub 
silentio—“rested on the unique features of bankruptcy.”
174
  
The vast majority of amicus briefs favored Allen’s position, including 
those submitted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Copyright Alliance, 
and Dow Jones & Company.
175
 Beyond formal filings, Professor Adam 
Mossoff’s commentary in the Wall Street Journal asserted that the original 
meanings of Article I and the Eleventh Amendment suggest that states 
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cannot plunder property with impunity.
176
 In support of North Carolina, the 
Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities and the Association of 
American Universities offered a perspective not covered in the other briefs. 
“Preserving state sovereign immunity helps protect [the] strong public 
purpose of state universities,” the associations argued.
177
 “The unlawful 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity,” they continued, “will cause state 




When the Supreme Court heard the case in November 2019, Professor 
Howard Wasserman suggested that some of the justices seemed skeptical of 
blatant attempts by states to pirate copyrighted material in reliance on their 
sovereign immunity.
179
 Derek Shaffer, the attorney representing Allen and 
Nautilus, fielded questions from Justices Ginsburg, Samuel A. Alito Jr., 
Kagan, and Kavanaugh about Florida Prepaid and whether that precedent 
controls the outcome.
180
 In an exchange with Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor, 
Shaffer argued that it would be “‘antithetical’ to say that any government 
can infringe the rights Congress has secured.”
181
 After Justices Alito and 
Kagan asked why a congressional record of sixteen documented instances 
of copyright infringement were enough when eight instances of patent 
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infringement did not create a sufficient record in Florida Prepaid, Shaffer 
responded, “the reality is Congress saw the tip of the iceberg of this 
problem.”
182
 Justice Kagan pressed further about the difference between 
Florida Prepaid and this case: “Now what’s the difference between the 
two—other than eight” documented instances of infringement.
183
 Shaffer 
attempted to mollify that point by observing that “patent infringement could 




North Carolina Deputy Solicitor General Ryan Park received difficult 
questioning about the state’s brazen appropriation of copyrighted works.
185
 
Justice Ginsburg commented that this case “sounds pretty intentional to 
me,” and that there is “‘something unseemly’ about a state’s being able to 
hold copyrights and sue for infringement” but also maintain that it “can 
infringe to [its] heart’s content and be immune from any compensatory 
damages.”
186
 Justice Breyer questioned whether a state could create its own 
online streaming service by “charging $5 or something to run ‘Rocky,’ 
‘[Captain] Marvel,’ ‘Spider-Man’ and perhaps ‘Groundhog Day,’” all of 
which would result in “[s]everal billion dollars flow[ing] into the 
treasury.”
187
 “Now, if you win,” he pressed Park, “why won’t that 
happen?”
188
 Justice Sotomayor likewise reflected on how she found 
Blackbeard’s Law “deeply troubling,” but also wondered what could be 
done after Florida Prepaid.
189
 Toward the end of the argument, Justice 
Breyer posed a hypothetical about the prospect of “the University of 
California making 50,000 unauthorized copies of a Norman Mailer book 
available to students.”
190
 He expressed concern about “the risk of unfairness 
to authors and inventors alike,” lamenting that Congress “could perhaps try 




Although the import of Florida Prepaid dominated the argument, many 
predicted that Allen would prevail. Writing for USA Today, Richard Wolf 
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seemed confident that “[t]he Supreme Court appeared likely Tuesday to 
rule that North Carolina’s display of a 300-year-old pirate ship’s salvage 
operation amounts to piracy.”
192
 So too did Professor Wasserman.
193
 But a 
lot changed in the world between November 2019 and March 2020.  
C. What Copyright Pirates of Pirate Copyrights Can Teach About Respect 
for Precedent 
The Supreme Court released its decision in Allen v. Cooper on March 23, 
2020, affirming the Fourth Circuit and concluding that Congress did not 
properly abrogate state sovereign immunity when it passed the CRCA.
194
 
On that day, in a major departure from its normal practice due to COVID-
19 concerns, the justices issued four opinions without taking the bench.
195
 
The public learned of the decisions released that day by checking the 
postings on the Court’s website.
196
 The Court posted its first decision at 
10:00 a.m.
197
 and its decision in Allen v. Cooper roughly five minutes 
later.
198
 This was the first time that the Court issued an opinion without 
taking the bench since Bush v. Gore—the case that “effectively decided the 
2000 election”—which was “heard and decided over the justices’ winter 
break.”
199
 It was, in many ways, eerie, especially for those who thought 
they “knew, that as sure as the cherry trees would bloom in the last two 
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weeks of March, the justices would be on the bench.”
200
 Amid the 
handwringing about the value of precedent and perceived consequences of 
destabilizing the rule of law, hitting refresh on a computer to see newly 
issued opinions emphasized that having ivory-tower concerns is a luxury, 
easily displaced and never again to be taken for granted.
201
  
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
202
 Justice Thomas 
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, while Justice Breyer, 
joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment.
203
 And Justice 
Kagan’s opinion read like a paean to stare decisis, while still exemplifying 
how to craft a decision focused on the public’s interest in precedent and the 
parties’ burden to demonstrate why a departure is necessary. 
Justice Kagan began by explaining that “our decision in Florida Prepaid 
compels the same conclusion” that Congress acted without proper authority 
in abrogating state sovereign immunity when it passed the CRCA.
204
 
Without derogating any precedent, the Court explained that, despite it 
“nowhere explicitly set out in the Constitution,” “[i]n our constitutional 
scheme, a federal court generally may not hear a suit brought by any person 
against a nonconsenting State.”
205
 In assessing Allen’s arguments that 
Congress acted consistent with its powers under Article I and Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court made clear that “[t]he slate on which 
we write today is anything but clean,” and that “Florida Prepaid, along 
with other precedent, forecloses each of Allen’s arguments.”
206
 In the spirit 
of fealty to precedent, the Court acknowledged that “stare decisis . . . is a 
‘foundation stone of the rule of law.’”
207
 
Addressing Congress’s powers under Article I to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity, the Court explained that Florida Prepaid “already 
rejected [this] theory,” which compelled the reasoning, “if not the Patent 
Remedy Act, not its copyright equivalent either, and for the same 
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 The Court also rejected the argument that Katz refined the 
analysis under Florida Prepaid and Seminole Tribe, explaining “the opinion 
reflects what might be called bankruptcy exceptionalism,” in which the 
Bankruptcy Clause is “sui generis—again, ‘unique’—among Article I’s 
grants of authority.”
209
 Justice Kagan noted that, while the Court “view[s] 
bankruptcy as on a different plane,” there is “[n]othing in that 
understanding” which “invites the kind of general, ‘clause-by-clause’ 
reexamination of Article I that Allen proposes.”
210
 
As for Congress’s power to pass the CRCA under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court intoned that “Florida Prepaid again 
serves as the critical precedent.”
211
 The Court observed how Florida 
Prepaid had “determined that the [Patent Reform Act’s] abrogation of 
immunity—again, the equivalent of the CRCA’s—was out of all proportion 
to what it found” to justify eliminating state sovereign immunity.
212
 And in 
offering a model for how to apply precedent, the Court referenced its past 
analysis as both “the starting point of our inquiry here,” as well as “the 
ending point too unless the evidence of unconstitutional infringement is 
materially different for copyrights than patents.”
213
 The Court then 
determined that “the concrete evidence of States infringing copyrights 
(even ignoring whether those acts violate due process) is scarcely more 
impressive than what the Florida Prepaid Court saw.”
214
 In view of the 
“exceedingly slight” constitutional injuries that the Patent Remedy Act 
sought and the CRCA seeks to vindicate, “[i]t follows that the balance the 




Justice Kagan also addressed stare decisis with an eye not toward 
rehashing old arguments, but instead addressing whether the parties 
provided evidence that society has adjusted to a point that now demands a 
different result.
216
 This approach salved whatever bitter debates could have 
been reignited through relitigating which decisions are better reasoned than 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Id. at 1002. 
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. at 1003. 
 211. Id. at 1005. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. at 1006. 
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others. For Allen to win, by the Court’s accounting, he had to convince at 
least five justices that “‘special justification,’ over and above the belief 
‘that the precedent was wrongly decided’”  warranted upsetting a 
“foundation stone of the rule of law.”
217
 That “Florida Prepaid was wrong” 
because “the decision misjudged Congress’s authority,”
218
 the Court 
concluded, is “nothing special at all.”
219
 A bare “charge of error alone . . . 
cannot overcome stare decisis.”
220
  
The decision also provided a pathway forward for Congress and litigants 
with hopes of “bring[ing] digital Blackbeards to justice.”
221
 After all, 
“going forward, Congress will know those rules,” “would presumably 
approach the issue differently than when it passed the CRCA,” and “if it 
detects violations of due process, then it may enact a proportionate 
response” to “effectively stop States from behaving as copyright pirates.”
222
 
The same is true of advocates. That is because “Florida Prepaid all but 
prewrote” how lawyers should approach these issues.
223
 
Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, 
identifying “two disagreements and one question that remains open for 
resolution in a future case.”
224
 He first repeated his position from 2019 that 
the Court has an obligation to overrule “demonstrably erroneous” 
decisions.
225
 He then admonished that courts should “not purport to advise 
Congress on how it might exercise its legislative authority, nor give [their] 
blessing to hypothetical statutes or legislative records not at issue here.”
226
 
He concluded by suggesting that “whether copyrights are property within 




Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, offered an almost farewell-to-
arms-style concurrence in the judgment. He began by suggesting that, 
“when proven to have pirated intellectual property, States must pay for 
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 He then offered some optimism that “perhaps 
Congress will venture into this great constitutional unknown” and fashion a 
statute comporting with the majority’s reasoning. And his conclusion 
reiterated his enduring view that “something is amiss” with the Court’s 
sovereign-immunity precedents, citing various dissents he either joined or 
authored.
229
 Yet, resigned to the conclusion that his “longstanding view has 
not carried the day, and that the Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid 
controls this case,” he concurred in the judgment simpliciter.
230
 It was 
classy, displaying no grudge or disrespect to his colleagues past or present. 
And for a justice self-isolating due to COVID-19 with “his wife, daughter 
and three grandchildren” under one roof, all while regularly cooking Italian 
pot roast for his family, it was a peaceful opinion.
231
  
Commentators hailed the decision as victory for the value of precedent 
and stare decisis. The hosts of Strict Scrutiny celebrated that “stare decisis 
is not for suckers, at least when Justice Kagan is writing.”
232
 Lisa Soronen 
of the State and Local Legal Center remarked that it “is significant for 
states in the big picture because the [C]ourt held the line on its sovereign 
immunity precedent.”
233
 Nina Totenberg of NPR suggested that the 
“opinion was couched in terms of deference to precedent—namely in this 
case, the precedents of the last 26 years.”
234
 Professor Re offered that, 
despite a “famously controversial and complicated” area of the law, 
“instead of going to first-principles, members of the majority could 
coalesce easily around a shared analysis and conclusion, without having to 
reinvent the jurisprudential wheel.”
235
 Professor Wasserman was succinct: 
“this is a 9-0 case—everyone agreeing that the statute is invalid in light of 
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 Professor Michael Dorf reflected that “stare decisis—
the obligation of courts to adhere to precedents absent a ‘special 
justification’—pretty much commanded the result in Allen.”
237
 He also put 
forth the idea that the progressive justices’ willingness to preserve state-
rights precedents might have been offered to entice at least one 
conservative justice to vote in favor of certain progressive precedents.
238
 
Tom Goldstein, publisher of the inestimable SCOTUSblog, offered the 
nuanced view that a “generational divide” may exist among the progressive 
justices in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan “seemingly accept” 
precedents that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer “would overrule.”
239
  
These commentators are correct. But the decision could stand for more. 
D. Stare Decisis as a Norms-Based Solution 
Stare decisis scored a win in the result, but the real victory of Allen v. 
Cooper could be in its use as a template for deciding cases. Issues of first 
impression in constitutional law are infrequent, so the opportunity for 
modern judges to write tableau rosa is rare. And when the “slate on which 
[they] write . . . is anything but clean,”
240
 there is a benefit to focusing less 
on whether precedent is erudite and more on whether evidence is available 
to show how society is ready and requires something different. 
Justice Kagan did not praise or derogate the Court’s jurisprudence on 
state sovereign immunity, offering only the uncontroversial observation that 
the doctrine “is nowhere explicitly set out in the Constitution.”
241
 And 
rather than revisiting old arguments and erstwhile views on federalism and 
our constitutional order, the two justices who dissented in the past simply 
acknowledged that their “longstanding view has not carried the day, and 
that the Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid controls this case.”
242
 Although 
Justice Thomas maintained his pertinacious view on how to apply stare 
decisis, that separate writing in no way suggested that his colleagues either 
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arrogated power or abdicated their duties.
243
 That opinion also did not 
revive any of the dissenting positions from Katz.
244
 Instead of a debate red 
in tooth and claw, it was clean, cordial, and even breezy. 
Perhaps as a product of deflecting attention away from the justices’ 
views on rightly and wrongly decided cases, legal commentators accepted 
Allen v. Cooper, despite misgivings that “the Court’s sovereign immunity 
doctrine is a mess of its own making.”
245
 Some assert that the state 
sovereign immunity doctrine “rests on a highly dubious construction of the 
constitutional text, serves a largely symbolic interest in the ‘dignity’ of the 
states, and includes an extremely complex and mutually contradictory set of 
rules, exceptions, and exceptions to the exceptions.”
246
 And yet 
“[p]reserving the existing body of state sovereign immunity doctrine might 
be necessary to preserve other more valuable doctrines as part of a stare 
decisis bargain.”
247
 The decision, in effect, blunted criticism of “the product 
of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture,”
248
 by 
couching the result in terms of what was foreordained by the past. This 
approach carries a constructive value to society, not least because the 
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In raw terms of stare decisis becoming more of a solution than a 
problem, the decision bore legitimacy because society had oriented to the 
constitutional order dictated by precedent without fissuring to demand a 
different outcome. No justice can be accused of playing politics when 
precedent directs a certain result and the parties fail to marshal evidence or 
justifiable reasoning as to why society demands a different outcome. And 
when more than half of Americans believe that the justices cannot set aside 
their personal and political views when interpreting the Constitution, Allen 




A retreat from a preoccupation over whether jurists of the past followed 
certain prescriptions of interpretation or held fidelity to a particular method 
or mode of analysis makes sense. After all, one aim of the American legal 
system is to fashion a rule that “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial 
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process.”
251
 To these ends, it is the fluidity of society, not a change 
in who occupies a seat on bench, that should be the source of understanding 
when precedent loses evenhandedness or undermines the systematic 
integrity of the American legal system. Focusing on the public defangs the 
impulse to upset fighting faiths. 
The decision further represents how norms, public expectations, and 
societal aspirations can play a cardinal role in cases touching on stare 
decisis. Norms take primacy, in this instance, over political philosophy. The 
Court was candid in its assessment of precedent; it was neither pugnacious 
nor tendentious. Its analysis tracked and explained what litigants must do 
for precedent to work in their favor. It also provided a pathway to reach a 
distinguishable result. And it clarified that, if outright overruling of 
precedent is required, convincing the justices that their predecessors’ good-
faith efforts were “wrong” by itself is “nothing special at all.”
252
 Although 
the Court did not catalogue every ingredient that could go into crafting a 
special justification, it baked into the process an onus on litigants to provide 
evidence in their favor. And upon detection of previously unknown, or 
difficult to perceive as is, constitutional violations suffered by the public 
that come into view based on a matured understanding of society and its 
                                                                                                                 
 250. See Golde, Confidence with Caveats, supra note 83. 
 251. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (quoting Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). 
 252. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (2020).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
282 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:245 
 
 
future, precedent should not prevent judicial action “tailored” to 
“effectively stop” the government—state or federal—“from behaving as . . . 
pirates.”
253
 So when the system begins thinking of the public as the suckers 
who suffer most when norms are bulldozed, their interests move from being 
an afterthought to a foreground influence. Being a sucker (or pirate) is not 
so bad under those terms. 
In an insular world—one where only 439 lucky individuals can sit in the 
justice’s courtroom while in session—a more inclusive approach to 
decision-making could make the least accessible branch of government 
more attuned to the people it serves.
254
 The stare decisis difficulty is only 
that if judges continue with a jurist-centric analysis. Nothing prevents 
judges from placing greater emphasis on precedent’s continued role in 
society and whether evidence might demonstrate a need for a fresh, revised 
approach. Depressurizing tension in this area may indeed demand this 
approach. Far from a difficulty, the latter would be the stare decisis 
solution. And for that, Justice Kagan’s opinion provides an example of how 
a decision should look forward, not into the past, to decide whether 
precedent should dictate the outcome of a dispute. Allen v. Cooper, in sum, 
represents hope.  
IV. Conclusion 
Citing Winston Churchill, Justice Gorsuch observed “that the world is 
divided into people who own their governments and governments who own 
their people, and it is vital we never cross that line.”
255
 The American legal 
system belongs to the people. And their “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a 
jurisprudence of doubt.”
256
 The fighting faiths of justices and judges will no 
doubt endure ad infinitum. But the privilege to have those faiths etched into 
legal history is a license granted to them by the people they serve. 
Normative expectations matter. And the difficulty of stare decisis is not so 
difficult when those fighting faiths yield to instead reflect on the public, the 
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societal considerations upon which the legal system is built, and the rights 
that the system is designed to protect. Stare decisis provides reassurances 
that are shared by judges, lawyers, pirates, suckers, and all others. The 
public should trust and take courts at their word. Courts should do the same, 
unless society demonstrates that change is necessary. 
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